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NOTE 
Bargaining with Bite: Missouri High Court’s 
Constitutional Holdings Alter Public Sector 
Labor Law  
Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police v. City of Chesterfield, 
 386 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. 2012); 
American Federation of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2012) 
PETER W. BAY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Collective bargaining – negotiations over working conditions between 
an employer and representatives of their employees
1
 – appeared as early as 
1891 as labor unions arose in response to the Industrial Revolution.
2
  Collec-
tive bargaining in private industry was recognized in 1935 by the National 
Labor Relations Act
3
 but was considered prohibited in the public sector.
4
  In 
1945, the state of Missouri ratified its constitution, which included article 1, 
  
 * B.S., Texas Christian University 2008; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law 2014; Associate Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2013-14.  
Thanks to Professor Josh Hawley, Dean Rafael Gely, and members of the Missouri 
Law Review for critical feedback. 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (9th ed. 2009). 
 2. A Timeline of Events in Modern American Labor Relations, FEDERAL 
MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail. 
asp?categoryID=21&itemID=15810 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013). 
 3. See discussion infra Part III. 
 4. In 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt commented on the issue of public 
sector collective bargaining in a letter to the president of the National Federation of 
Federal Employees:  
All Government employees should realize that the process of collective bar-
gaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service.  
It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied to public per-
sonnel management.  The very nature and purposes of Government make it 
impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the em-
ployer in mutual discussions with Government employee organizations.  The 
employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their 
representatives in Congress.  Accordingly, administrative officials and em-
ployees alike are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by 
laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.   
Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward (Aug. 16. 1937), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15445#axzz1UdkHgsqd. 
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section 29, a provision protecting employee collective bargaining rights.
5
  
That provision, however, was quickly interpreted by courts as applying only 
to private employees,
6
 and thus, public employees had little power to negoti-
ate employment terms.  In the 1960s the Missouri legislature passed a number 
of public sector labor laws that established a very limited collective bargain-
ing framework applicable to most government employees.
7
  This area of Mis-
souri law remained relatively untouched until 2007 when, in Independence-
National Education Ass’n v. Independence School District, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri reinterpreted article 1, section 29 as applying to all Mis-
souri employees.
8
  The holding was a decisive victory for teachers and law 
enforcement (who are statutorily excluded from the public sector labor laws)
9
 
but left many questions as to what the holding would mean.  Then in 2012, 
the Court again interpreted article 1, section 29 in a pair of cases handed 
down on the same day: Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police v. City of Ches-
terfield
10
 and American Federation of Teachers v. Ledbetter.
11
  The decisions 
considered the scope of article 1, section 29, specifically whether the consti-
tutional right of public employees to collectively bargain imposed a corre-
sponding affirmative duty on public employers to collectively bargain with 
their employees.
12
  The Court held that such a duty is inherent in article 1, 
section 29 – public employers must bargain with employee unions
13
 and must 
do so in good faith with an eye toward reaching an agreement.
14
  This Note 
examines the evolution of collective bargaining rights in Missouri and dis-
cusses the import of these 2012 holdings. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
A. Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police 
In the first case, plaintiff Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal 
Order of Police, Lodge 15 (FOP) sued separately the Missouri cities of   
Chesterfield and University City (the cities).
15
  In 2007 and 2008, the majori-
ty of the cities’ police officers agreed to certify FOP as their exclusive      
  
 5. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 29. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 8. 223 S.W.3d 131, 139 (Mo. 2007). 
 9. See State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Mo. 1969). 
 10. 386 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. 2012). 
 11. 387 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2012). 
 12. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 760-61; Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 
S.W.3d at 363. 
 13. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 762. 
 14. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 S.W.3d at 367. 
 15. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 758. 
2
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representative for collective bargaining with the cities.
16
  FOP asked the cities 
to recognize their representative status and to establish the procedures neces-
sary for collective bargaining because none existed statutorily.
17
  The cities 
denied the request.
18
   
FOP then brought separate suits in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County 
against each city seeking a declaratory judgment that article 1, section 29 of 
the Missouri Constitution imposed an affirmative duty on the cities to imple-
ment a framework that would allow collective bargaining to take place.
19
  The 
cities answered that no such duty existed and that the court lacked authority 
to order a public employer to adopt collective bargaining procedures.
20
  FOP 
won both cases, and the trial courts ordered the cities to set up a collective 
bargaining framework covering the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit,
21
 
election procedures to certify FOP as employee representative, and proce-
dures for the “meet and confer” process.
22
  The cities separately appealed to 
the Missouri Court of Appeals, which issued opinions before ultimately trans-
ferring the cases to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
23
 
The cities’ position on appeal was that: (1) a public employer has no af-
firmative duty to institute a collective bargaining framework for statutorily 
exempted public employees and likewise no duty to recognize and engage in 
actual collective bargaining with unions, and (2) the Missouri Constitution’s 
separation of powers doctrine prohibits a court from ordering a city to legis-
late such a framework.
24
   
Judge Patricia Breckenridge for the majority (with Judge Zel Fischer 
dissenting), reversed the trial court orders that the cities establish a speci-    
fic bargaining framework
25
 but held that article 1, section 29 did impose      





 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  “Appropriate unit” under Missouri law is a “unit of employees . . . of a 
public body . . . [with] a clear and identifiable community of interest . . . .”  MO. REV. 
STAT. § 105.500 (2000).  Determining the scope of the appropriate unit means estab-
lishing the proper employee group to be represented in collective bargaining. 
 22. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 758. 
 23. E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield, No. ED 95366, 2011 WL 
1712262, at *5 (Mo. App. E.D. May 3, 2011). 
 24. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 758-59. 
 25. Id. at 758.  Rather than deciding whether a court ordering a city to establish 
collective bargaining procedures violates the separation of powers doctrine, the Court 
instead reversed that part of the trial court orders on the grounds that it was overbroad 
and unnecessary to satisfy constitutional requirements.  Id. at 764.  
 26. Id. at 757-58. 
3
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B. American Federation of Teachers 
The second case, American Federation of Teachers v. Ledbetter, in-
volved a teacher’s union.
27
  The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 
sued the board of education of the Construction Career Center Charter School 
District (the board).
28
  In 2008 and 2009, AFT met with the board several 
times.  In January 2009, they reached a tentative and informal collective     
bargaining agreement on all issues except salaries.
29
  In January and February 
2009, the board held several closed-door meetings before deciding to reject 
the tentative agreement and submit a revised proposal to the AFT.
30
  At          
a March 2009 meeting, the board unilaterally adopted teacher salaries for the 
2009-2010 academic year.
31
  The next day, the board met with the AFT      
but did not mention its salary decision.
32
  Then in April 2009, the board again 
met with the AFT and proposed salaries for the 2009-2010 academic year, 
giving the union six days to respond.
33
  Four days later, the AFT made a 
counterproposal on the issue of salaries, which the board rejected.
34
  Thereaf-
ter, the AFT petitioned the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis for a declara-
tory judgment that the board had failed its duty to bargain collectively under 




The trial court found in favor of the board, holding that Missouri’s con-
stitution does not impose an affirmative duty on a public employer to collec-
tively bargain or to do so in good faith.
36
  The court, however, stated that if 
such a duty of good faith bargaining did exist, the board failed to satisfy it as 
that term is defined under federal labor law.
37
 
The AFT appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which transferred 
the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
38
  On appeal, the AFT argued   
that because the constitution gives employees a right to collectively bargain, 
employers have a corresponding duty to collectively bargain in good     
faith.
39
  The board conceded that it does have the duty to “meet and confer” 
  
 27. 387 S.W.3d 360, 361 (Mo. 2012). 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 362. 
 30. Id.  The board posted agendas for these closed-door meetings just twenty-
four hours in advance.  Id. 
 31. Id.  In this meeting the board did not record votes or minutes.  Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, No. ED 95131, 2011 WL 1855665, at 
*3 (Mo. App. E.D. May 7, 2011). 
 39. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 S.W.3d at 363. 
4
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with the union
40




Judge Breckenridge for the majority (with Judge Fischer dissenting), re-
versed the trial court, finding (1) that the right of public employees to collec-
tively bargain imposes an affirmative duty for public employers to “meet and 
confer” with them, (2) that this duty inherently includes a good faith obliga-
tion on the part of the employer, and (3) that the trial court erred in finding 
that the board failed its good faith obligation because it defined that term 
under federal, rather than Missouri law.
42
 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The right to assemble for the purpose of joining labor unions is protect-
ed both by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
43
 as well as article 1, 
section 8 of the Missouri Constitution.
44
  Federal policy and legislation favor-
ing collective bargaining began after World War I and continued through the 
1920s and 1930s,
45
 but the first true broad strokes came with the procedures 
laid out in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA).
46
  Congress 
found that employer denial of employee rights to organize and collectively 
bargain caused strikes and “industrial strife or unrest.”
47
  On signing the act, 
President Franklin Roosevelt stated that the act’s purpose was a “better rela-
tionship between labor and management,” premised on an “equitable basis” 
and “orderly procedure[s].”
48
  For nearly all private employees, the NLRA 
thus specifically guaranteed and protected the right of collective bargaining 
through representatives chosen by the employees and attempted to establish 
procedures that would facilitate bargaining.
49
  The NLRA as enacted in 1935 
did not define the term “collective bargaining,” and the major spokesmen for 
the bill seemed to have very different views of what the process would look 
like.
50
  The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA gave more guid-
  
 40. Id.  Note that this concession by the board runs contrary to the trial court’s 
holding that no such duty existed.  Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 367-68. 
 43. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945); McLaughlin v. 
Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1968). 
 44. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo. 1969). 
 45. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 S.W.3d at 364-66. 
 46. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 47. § 151. 
 48. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the National Labor Relations 
Act, (July 5, 1935), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. 
php?pid=14893.  
 49. §§ 151, 157. 
 50. Robert P. Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. 
L. REV. 248, 252-53 (1964). 
5
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ance,
51
 and it was here that the good faith bargaining standard generally be-
came part of the bargaining process.
52
  The NLRA addresses, among other 
things, the details for collective bargaining, the election of representatives, 
union dues, unfair labor practices, and the establishment of the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB) to handle and prevent disputes.
53
  However, the 
NLRA does not cover public employees.
54
  
The push for collective bargaining rights federally was soon mirrored at 
the state level.  Section A of this Part discusses Missouri’s constitutional and 
statutory efforts to protect employee bargaining rights, while Section B exam-
ines initial judicial interpretations of those efforts. 
A. Sources of Collective Bargaining Rights in Missouri 
Missouri included in its 1945 state constitution article 1, section 29, 
which provides “[t]hat employees shall have the right to organize and to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.”
55
  During 
the debates of the 1943-1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri, R.T. 
Wood (the sponsor of article 1, section 29) stated that although the right of 
employees to bargain collectively already existed (by virtue of federal labor 
law), inclusion of a collective bargaining provision in the Missouri Constitu-
tion was necessary to “preclude the possibility . . . [of] many bills being in-
troduced seeking to destroy collective bargaining” and to provide a “measure 
of protection” for organized labor in Missouri.
56
  Although written for (and 
long constrained to) the private sector, article 1, section 29 applies today to 
all employees.
57
  This places Missouri alongside Florida and Hawaii as the 





 51. The House passed a very detailed definition of collective bargaining which 
sought to bring a standard of objectivity.  Id. at 254-55.  The Senate, however, rolled 
this back significantly, resulting in the language which was ultimately passed by Con-
gress over the veto of President Truman.  Id. at 255. 
 52. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Mo. 2012). 
 53. See generally §§ 151-169. 
 54. § 152. 
 55. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 29. 
 56. Debates of the 1943-1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri (Apr. 27, 
1944), in UNIV. OF MO. DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://digital.library.umsystem.edu/ 
cgi/t/text/pagevieweridx?sid=03a4e06c6fe107bc296a3a286a262fe5&idno=mcd19450
8&c=mcd&cc=mcd&seq=288&view=image. 
 57. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 58. See Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on 
the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 735 n.2 
(2009).  By way of comparison, many other states have comprehensive bargaining 
statutes in lieu of a constitutional provision.  Id. at 735 n.3.  Public sector collective 
 
6
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In 1965, the Missouri Legislature enacted public sector labor laws that 
codified official rights and procedures by which most public employees could 
join labor unions, nominate exclusive bargaining representatives, and conduct 
something akin to collective bargaining.
59
  In addition to allowing nominated 
union representatives to make employment proposals to “any public body,” 
the statutes also protect employees from discharge or other acts of discrimina-
tion or coercion by their employers on the basis of exercising union rights.
60
  
Section 105.520, RSMo, the “Meet and Confer” provision, describes the 
framework under which collective bargaining may take place but does not 
nearly approximate the extensive coverage of the NLRA.
61
  Employers are 
required to “meet, confer and discuss” any proposals made by bargaining 
representatives, record the results of the discussions, and present them to the 
appropriate legislative or governing body to accept, modify, or reject.
62
  The 
provisions further note that all Missouri public employees are denied the right 
to strike.
63
  The no-strike provision is a significant example of the distinction 
the law makes between public and private employees.  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri has offered various rationales for the no-strike law, including: (1) 
the essentiality of many public employees to public safety, health, and order, 




Of particular relevance here is that these provisions explicitly exclude 
all “police, deputy sheriffs, Missouri state highway patrolmen, Missouri Na-
tional Guard, [and] all teachers of all Missouri schools, colleges and universi-
ties” from coverage.
65
  The weighty societal importance of law enforcement 
and public educators is at least one meaningful explanation for this exclusion.  
However, regardless of the purpose, police officers and teachers cannot look 
to Missouri statutes to find collective bargaining rights or procedures. For 
years, teachers and law enforcement have been forced to rely on their em-
ployers bargaining voluntarily on the basis of Federal and State associational 
rights.  Recently, numerous bills have been proposed in the Missouri General 
Assembly that seek to amend the public sector labor laws to remove the statu-
tory exclusion, but none have been passed.
66
   
  
bargaining is illegal in two states (Virginia and North Carolina) and not formally 
recognized in six others.  Id. at 735 n.4.  
 59. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-530 (1965); Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. 
Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Mo. 2007). 
 60. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.510 (2000). 
 61. Developments in the Law – Public Employment: Collective Bargaining in the 
Public Sector, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1676, 1680 (1984). 
 62. § 105.520. 
 63. § 105.530. 
 64. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 133. 
 65. § 105.510. 
 66. See discussion infra Part V. 
7
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Shortly after their passage, the public sector labor laws were challenged 
and upheld in State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool.
67
  The Supreme Court 
explained that the statutes give employees the right to join unions and present 
proposals to employers free from discrimination.
68
  Employers are not re-




[The statutes] do not purport to give to public employees       
the right of collective bargaining guaranteed by [article 1,     
section 29] to employees in private industry and in the sense 
that term is usually known with its attendant connotation of   
unfair labor practice for refusal by the employer to execute and 
adopt the agreement produced by bargaining, and the use of 
strike as a bargaining device constitutionally protected to pri-
vate employees . . . .  The act provides only a procedure for 
communication between the organization selected by public 









B. Employees Covered by Article 1, Section 29:  
Clouse Through Independence 
Article 1, section 29 is succinct and does not include any limiting lan-
guage.  It stands in contrast to the NLRA, which is limited to most private 
employees and specifically excludes government workers.  Not surprisingly, 
it was precisely the issue of which employees were covered by article 1, sec-
tion 29 that was litigated just two years after the adoption of the Missouri 
Constitution in 1947.
72
  In City of Springfield v. Clouse, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri determined that article 1, section 29 did not apply to public employ-
ees.
73
  Clouse was an action by a municipal corporation against certain offic-
ers and union representatives.
74
  The city sought a declaratory judgment as to 
the legal power of the city to enter into collective bargaining agreements with 
  
 67. 441 S.W.2d 35, 45 (Mo. 1969). 
 68. Id. at 40-41. 
 69. Id. at 41. 
 70. Id. (citation omitted). 
 71. Id. at 43. 
 72. See City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1947), overruled by 
Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 137 
(Mo. 2007). 
 73. Id. at 542. 
 74. Id. at 541. 
8
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unions on the issues of wages, hours, and working conditions.
75
  The issue 
was whether article 1, section 29 applied to a municipality.
76
  According to 
the Court, nothing prevented public employees from organizing into labor 
unions; however, collective bargaining was “an entirely different matter.”
77
  
The Court cited statements of President Franklin Roosevelt and article 1, 
section 29 sponsor R.T. Wood discussing the impossibility of transferring the 
process of collective bargaining into the public sector.
78
  They then noted that 
article 1, section 29’s substantial similarity to the collective bargaining provi-
sion of the NLRA evidenced a purpose to safeguard collective bargaining 
rights as they were understood in the private sector.
79
  However, the Court’s 
primary thrust rested on separation of powers and the non-delegation doc-
trine.
80
  Wages, hours, and working conditions of public employees are set by 
municipal ordinance.
81
  If the non-delegation doctrine prevents the legislature 
from delegating its law-making power to executive officials, then “surely 
[such power] cannot be bargained or contracted away.”
82
  In other words, 
collective bargaining between a labor union and a public employer would 
amount to an unconstitutional negotiation for legislation, and thus, article 1, 
section 29 could not be read to apply to public employees. Clouse remained 
good law for sixty years. 
This all changed in 2007 with the significant Independence-National 
Educational Ass’n v. Independence School District.
83
  Independence over-
turned or abrogated three longstanding cases – a combined 134 years of prec-
edent.
84
  The decision is most notable for its overruling of Clouse and new 
reading of article 1, section 29.  The Independence School District was sued 
by labor unions representing three of the district’s groups of public employ-
ees: transportation, custodial, and teachers.
85
  To comply with public sector 
labor laws that covered the transportation and custodial workers, the district 
had a practice in place of meeting and conferring separately with the unions 
and reducing the results to writing.
86
  Although teachers are excluded from 
public sector labor laws, the district had always held discussion with the 
  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 542. 
 78. Id. at 542-43. 
 79. Id. at 543. 
 80. Id. at 544-46. 
 81. Id. at 545. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 223 S.W.3d 131 (Mo. 2007). 
 84. The Court overruled Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 
1982), City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1947), and abrogated 
Glidewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1958).  Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 137, 
140, 140 n.7.  Sumpter and Glidewell will not be discussed in this Note. 
 85. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 134. 
 86. Id. 
9
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teacher’s union as well.
87
  In 2002, the district had agreements in place with 
each union but rescinded each agreement and imposed its own new policy 
without notice.
88
  This unilateral rescission and imposition of new employ-
ment terms constituted a refusal to collectively bargain with the unions, but 
the district claimed such actions were lawful.
89
   
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the district violated its em-
ployees’ right to collectively bargain.
90
  It began by undercutting Clouse.
91
  
Clouse’s holding that article 1, section 29 applied only to private employees 
was based on the non-delegation doctrine, which had, sixty years later, be-
come an “anachronism” – it was now largely hollowed out federally and all 
but abandoned in Missouri.
92
  The Court also noted that, despite Clouse, most 
public employees had already gained the right to collectively bargain when 
the 1965 public sector labor laws were passed.
93
  This was significant because 
if Clouse’s broad proscription of collective bargaining in the public sector 
was to be followed, then the public sector labor laws, which had been held 
constitutional in 1969,
94
 were actually invalid.
95
 
The Court then looked to the plain meaning of article 1, section 29.
96
  
Although the 1943-1944 debates of the Missouri Constitution seemed to evi-
dence that the drafters intended article 1, section 29 to apply only to private 
employees, the people of Missouri ultimately voted on the words of the con-
stitution, not anything stated in deliberations.
97
  According to the Court, 
“[e]mployees plainly means employees,” and article 1, section 29 as passed 
contains no words limiting that provision to private employees.
98
  The Court 
would not read words into the constitution that were not there.
99
  Clouse was 
thus overruled, and the Court for the first time read article 1, section 29 as 
giving collective bargaining rights to all employees, public and private.
100
  
Finally, the Court briefly discussed how to define collective bargaining 
itself.
101
  State ex rel. Missey
102
 had upheld the public sector labor laws but 
  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 141. 
 91. Id. at 135. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 136. 
 94. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Mo. 1969). 
 95. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 138. 
 96. Id. at 137. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 138-39. 
 102. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969). 
10
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failed to define what was meant by collective bargaining.
103
  The Independ-
ence Court was aware of this lack of definition (it consulted dictionary defini-
tions in a footnote)
104
 but described the actions Missey found permissible 
under the statutes, essentially the “meet, confer and discuss” requirement.
105
  
The Independence Court added that “[t]he point of bargaining, of course, is to 
reach agreement.”
106
    
The Court next had to square this new interpretation with the public  
sector labor laws.
107
  Rather than invalidate these statutes to the extent they 
excluded teachers (because teachers, like all employees, had constitutional 
collective bargaining rights), the Court read the public sector labor laws       
as providing collective bargaining rights for the occupations included in      
the statutes, but not as precluding the omitted occupations (teachers) from 
exercising their article 1, section 29 right.
108
  Instead, the Court recognized 
that because there was no statutory framework in place for teachers, the   
legislative body (in this case, the district) would play a role in setting the  
bargaining framework.
109
  In reaching this conclusion, the Court found it  
significant that this particular school district had a history of voluntarily rec-
ognizing its teachers’ collective bargaining rights.
110
  This seemingly innocu-
ous passage turned out to be quite important in the reasoning of both the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions when the issue was ultimately litigated again in 
2012.
111
  Judge Price, dissenting in Independence and foreshadowing the 
instant decisions, seemed keenly aware that the book was not closed on pub-
lic sector bargaining:   
It seems less harm would result from leaving this longstanding proce-
dure in place than from giving public employees a new constitutional 
right to “collective bargaining” that the majority does not define, de-
scribes in terms similar to “meet and confer,” and the application of 
which no one can predict.
112
 
C. Early Scope of Article 1, Section 29: Quinn v. Buchanan 
Another early case helped define the scope of the collective bargaining 
right protected in article 1, section 29.  Coming twelve years after the Mis-
  
 103. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 138 (discussing Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41).   
See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 104. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 138 n.6. 
 105. Id. at 138 (citations omitted); see discussion supra Part III.A. 
 106. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 138. 
 107. Id. at 136. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-C, V. 
 112. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 148 (Price, J., dissenting). 
11
Bay: Bay: Bargaining with Bite
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Bay – Final Formatting 3/17/14 Created on:  3/18/2014 6:18:00 PM Last Printed: 3/18/2014 6:18:00 PM 
1310 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
souri Constitution in 1957, Quinn v. Buchanan held that article 1, section 29 
was only a guarantee that employee rights to organize and collectively bar-
gain would be protected from government interference.
113
  Buchanan,          
the defendant, operated a meat packaging business in Columbia, Missouri  
and employed several driver-salesmen.
114
  The employees organized and  
selected a local union to represent them in collective bargaining with         
Buchanan for wages, hours, and other employment terms.
115
  Buchanan’s 
sales manager told the employees that they would be discharged for unioniz-
ing as there was “no union allowed in [Buchanan’s] place of business.”
116
  
Buchanan attempted to coerce the employees to rescind their affiliation    
with the union for purposes of bargaining, and ultimately they were          
discharged.
117
  The employees claimed Buchanan’s actions violated their 
article 1, section 29 rights and sought reinstatement with back pay, punitive 
damages, and preventive relief enjoining Buchanan from (1) coercing em-
ployees to refrain from joining unions and (2) refusing to collectively bargain 
with selected union representatives.
118
   
The Court stated that bill of rights provisions like article 1, section 29 
were “primarily limitations on government, declaring rights that exist without 
any governmental grant.”
119
  Relying on constitutional treatises of the time, 
the Court found that typical bill of rights provisions merely declare rights that 
exist and are thus “self-executing,” meaning that government action in con-
travention of such rights is void.
120
  Self-executing provisions, said the Court, 
“do not . . . usually provide methods or remedies for their enforcement.”
121
  
Rather, it is up to the legislature to pass laws to enforce declared rights and in 
the absence of specific legislation, individuals may avail themselves of any 
common law or code remedy to prevent or redress violations.
122
  The Court 
found that Buchanan’s union-busting acts constituted a violation of his em-
ployees’ article 1, section 29 rights and granted preventive relief.
123
 
The Court went on to say that article 1, section 29 is “not a labor rela-
tions act, specifying rights, duties, practices and obligations of employers and 
labor organizations.”
124
  The provision was intended to protect employees 
from government interference with their declared rights to organize and bar-
  
 113. 298 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Mo. 1957), overruled by E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. 
City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. 2012). 
 114. Id. at 416. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 416-17. 
 119. Id. at 417. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 419. 
 124. Id. at 418. 
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gain collectively,
125
 however it does not create a correlating duty on the part 
of employers: “[t]he constitutional provision was shaped as a shield; the un-
ion seeks to use it as a sword.”
126
  In other words, the legislature was entitled 
to impose a corresponding affirmative duty requiring employers like Buchan-
an to collectively bargain with employees, but article 1, section 29 itself did 
not contain such a duty – it protected but did not require collective bargain-
ing.
127
  Therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to preventive relief requir-
ing Buchanan to collectively bargain and his refusal to do so was lawful.
128
  
Quinn remained good law and authoritative on the scope of article 1, section 
29 for the next fifty-five years.
129
 
IV. INSTANT DECISIONS 
A. Fraternal Order of Police 
The threshold issue of the case was whether the policemen’s union, 
FOP, had associational standing to sue the cities to enforce its members’ right 
to collectively bargain guaranteed by article 1, section 29 of the Missouri 
Constitution.
130
  The Court found that it did.
131
   
Next was the all-important issue of the duty to bargain collectively.
132
  
The Court began with the constitutional right of all employees to organize 
and collectively bargain
133
 and then noted the Missouri public labor statutes 
that codify that right for public employees.
134
  These statutes require the   
employer to “meet, confer and discuss” with employee representatives to 
come up with a written proposal, which the employer can accept, modify,     
or reject.
135
  The Court recognized that although policemen and teachers are 
excluded from these statutes (and therefore have no statutory procedures for 
  
 125. Id. at 419. 
 126. Id. (quoting Quill v. Eisenhower, 113 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. Sup.           
Ct. 1952)). 
 127. Id. at 420. 
 128. Id. at 419. 
 129. Quinn was overruled by Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police v. City of 
Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. 2012).  See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 130. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 759. 
 131. Id.  The Court found that FOP satisfied Missouri’s three requirements for 
associational standing: (1) the association’s members “have standing to sue in their 
own right;” (2) the interests sought to be protected are “germane” to the association’s 
purpose; and (3) the claim asserted and relief requested do not require individual 
participation by the members.  Id. 
 132. Id. at 760. 
 133. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 29; see discussion supra Part III.A.  
 134. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 105.510-520 (2000); see discussion supra Part III.A. 
 135. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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collective bargaining),
136
 the very notion of collective bargaining still       
inherently included negotiations between an employer and the employee’s 
representative.
137
  The majority acknowledged that such a conclusion was 
based on language in Independence, which identified “the role of public   
employers in collective bargaining.”
138
  Thus, notwithstanding the statutory 
exclusion, even employers of policemen have a duty to bargain collectively, 
adopting procedures as necessary.
139
  If this duty was not imposed on em-
ployers, said the Court, the employees’ article 1, section 29 right would be 
“render[ed] meaningless.”
140
   
The Court then addressed Quinn v. Buchanan,
141
 on which the cities had 
relied heavily and which remained the biggest obstacle to finding that article 
1, section 29 forced public employers to collectively bargain with their em-
ployees.
142
  Quinn was long-standing precedent and held that article 1, section 
29 did not require employers to collectively bargain with unions but that it 
only protected employee rights to organize and bargain from government 
interference.
143
  In other words, using Quinn, the cities argued that while the 
Missouri Constitution gave the policemen the right to collectively bargain (a 
right which the cities could not interfere with), that right did not force the 
cities to actually bargain.
144
 
The Court overruled Quinn, charging it with two erroneous infer-
ences.
145
  First was that the constitution’s bill of rights does not grant new 
rights but rather declares the rights which the people of Missouri already pos-
sess.
146
  The second was that the provisions of a bill of rights may only be 
self-executing limitations on government.
147
  These inferences led the Quinn 
Court to hold that any provision in a bill of rights (and thus, article 1, section 
29) can only be used as a “shield against governmental action and not as a 
sword allowing individuals to require its enforcement.”
148
  However, the 
Court found that Quinn had treated those inferences as absolute requirements, 
a reading which, in its view, did not comport with modern constitutional 
law.
149
  Specifically, the Court found that the people of Missouri can put any-
  
 136. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 137. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 760 (quoting Independence-Nat’l 
Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Mo. 2007)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957); see discussion supra Part III.C.  
 142. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 760-61. 
 143. Id. at 761; see discussion supra Part III.C. 
 144. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 760. 
 145. Id. at 761-62. 
 146. Id. at 761. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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thing they wish in their constitution
150
 (including provisions that grant affirm-
ative rights)
151
 and have, in fact, added subsequent non-self-executing provi-
sions.
152
  Because the Court found that Quinn had incorrectly read the limits 
of article 1, section 29, it overruled the decision.
153
 
Finally, the Court addressed the cities’ argument that the trial court’s or-
der that they establish a specific framework for bargaining
154
 violated the 
separation of powers doctrine.
155
  The cities claimed that to follow the trial 
court’s order would require the passing of ordinances; thus, it would amount 
to the judiciary ordering the legislature to legislate.
156
  The Court did not an-
swer whether the trial court’s order violated separation of powers; instead, it 
merely found the order to be overbroad and unnecessary.
157
  It determined 
that it is proper for a court to order legislative bodies to meet constitutional 
requirements while leaving the specifics to those bodies.
158
  Essentially, be-
cause Missouri public labor statutes themselves are not procedurally de-
tailed,
159
 the Court found that the trial court should only have mandated that 
the cities meet and confer, leaving them to work out the details including the 
adoption of any necessary procedures.
160
   
In sum, the majority found that policemen’s exclusion from Missouri 
public labor law did not excuse the policemen’s employers from their legally 
enforceable duty to bargain collectively with the policemen’s union.
161
 
B. American Federation of Teachers  
Beginning with the scope of the article 1, section 29 right (newly ex-
panded by Independence) and the public sector labor laws from which teach-
ers are excluded,
162
 the Court made explicit what had only been implicit in 
Independence: that despite the statutory exclusion, public employers had a 
constitutional duty to collectively bargain with their employees, a duty which 
  
 150. Id. at 762 (citing St. Louis Fire Fighters Ass’n Local No. 73 v. Stem-      
mler, 479 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Mo. 1972)).  They are limited only by the federal      
constitution.  Id.  
 151. Id.  Here the Court referenced other jurisdictions that had interpreted provi-
sions of their bills of rights, which imposed affirmative duties.  Id. 
 152. Id.  The Court cited article 1, section 32 as an example of a provision that did 
contemplate legislation (i.e., was non-self-executing).  Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra Part II.A. 
 155. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 762-63. 
 156. Id. at 763. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 763 n.6. 
 160. Id. at 763-64. 
 161. Id. at 764. 
 162. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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required “negotiations between an employer and the representatives of orga-
nized employees to determine the conditions of employment.”
163
   
Having found that article 1, section 29 imposed an affirmative duty on 
employers, the Court went on to discuss whether that duty contains a good 
faith standard.
164
  Because Missouri does not have a statutorily-based good 
faith bargaining standard, the question for the Court was whether that stand-
ard could be located in article 1, section 29 itself.
165
  Stating that the purpose 
of bargaining is to reach an agreement, the Court concluded that without a 
good faith standard the article 1, section 29 right would be redundant
166
 or 
nullified because employers could “act with the intent to thwart collective 
bargaining so as never to reach an agreement – frustrating the very purpose of 
bargaining and invalidating the right.”
167
   
The Court then established that “collective bargaining” was a technical 
term that had always been understood to include a duty to negotiate in     
good faith.
168
  This interpretation was supported by marshaling an extensive 
history of collective bargaining in America.
169
  The post-World War I War 
Labor Board (organized to handle labor disputes) did not recognize the     
duty of employers to bargain with employees, but recommended that they    
do so “in an earnest endeavor to reach an agreement.”
170
  Similarly, various 
policies associated with the Transportation Act of 1920 did not order       
good faith bargaining but emphasized that collective bargaining between  
carriers and railroad employees required “more than a mere perfunctory per-
  
 163. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Mo. 2012).  In-
dependence had not gone as far as expressly holding that the article 1, section 29 right 
imposed a duty on employers to collectively bargain; rather, in its discussion of the 
public sector labor statutes, it noted that in the absence of a statutory framework for 
bargaining (as in the case of teachers and policemen), the employer had a “role” to 
play in the process.  Independence-Nat’l Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 
S.W.3d 131, 136 (Mo. 2007); see discussion supra Part III.B.  Justice Fischer, dis-
senting in Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, did not see the above language of 
Independence as clearly imposing such a duty. 386 S.W.3d at 768 (Fischer, J., dis-
senting); see discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 164. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 S.W.3d at 363.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 364.  The right would be redundant, said the Court, because in situa-
tions where the public employer was a government entity, article 1, section 29 would 
guarantee employees no more than the right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances, a right already assured by the First Amendment of the federal constitu-
tion.  Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 365 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butch-
er Workmen of Am. V. W. Cold Storage Co., Nat’l War Labor Bd. Docket No. 80 
(1919)). 
16
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formance of the statute” and an “honest effort by the parties.”
171
  Then in the 
1930s, the National Labor Board
172
 found that collective bargaining required 
more than just meeting and conferring and that “[w]hile the law does not 
compel the parties to reach agreement, it [contemplates] that both parties will 
approach the negotiations with an open mind and will make a reasonable 
effort to reach a common ground of agreement.”
173
  In 1935, the NLRA was 
enacted and while it – like its statutory predecessors – did not include a good 
faith standard, the NLRB (responsible for administering the NLRA) found 
that a good faith standard was implicit in collective bargaining: “If the obliga-
tion of the Act is to produce more than a series of empty discussions, bargain-
ing must mean more than mere negotiation.”
174
  The Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments to the NLRA finally made explicit the good faith standard.
175
  There-
fore, according to the Court, by the time of the 1945 Missouri Constitution, 
the term collective bargaining would have been understood to mean good 
faith bargaining.
176
  Additionally, courts since 1945 have continued to find 
good faith negotiations implicit in collective bargaining, including strong 
words from the New Jersey Superior Court in 1985: “To say that the right to 
bargain collectively does not confer upon the employer a corresponding duty 
to likewise bargain is preposterous.  Surely, employees do not organize in 
order to conduct a sewing circle.”
177
 
Based on this history, the Court found that article 1, section 29’s imposi-
tion of the affirmative duty on public employers to bargain with their em-
ployers similarly included a good faith standard.
178
  Although the parties stip-
ulated that the actions of the school board did not constitute good faith bar-
gaining under federal law, the Court did not make such a determination, in-
stead remanding for an adjudication on the issue under Missouri law.
179
  The 
Court did not articulate what, if any, standard existed in Missouri Law for 
good faith bargaining, but did state that federal law would provide guidance 




 171. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 2 R.L.B. 87, 89 
(1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. This was an early agency responsible for administering the National Industri-
al Labor Act of 1933.  Id. 
 173. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Connecticut Coke Co., 2 N.L.B. 88,            
89 (1934)). 
 174. Id. at 366 (quoting Atlas Mills, 3 N.L.R.B. 10, 21 (1937)) (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted). 
 175. Id.; see discussion supra Part III. 
 176. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 S.W.3d at 366.  
 177. Id. at 366-67 (quoting Comite Organizador De Trabajadores Agricolas         
v. Levin, 515 A.2d 252, 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985)) (internal                  
alterations omitted). 
 178. Id. at 367. 
 179. Id. at 367-68. 
 180. Id. at 367 n.5. 
17
Bay: Bay: Bargaining with Bite
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Bay – Final Formatting 3/17/14 Created on:  3/18/2014 6:18:00 PM Last Printed: 3/18/2014 6:18:00 PM 
1316 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
C. The Dissent in Both Cases 
Because of the interrelatedness of both principal cases and the similarity 
of the issues covered by both dissents, this Section will synthesize the dis-
sent’s views on the Court’s decisions in Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police 
and American Federation of Teachers.  Judge Fischer found that the principal 
cases’ combined interpretation of article 1, section 29 amounted to the Court 
doing exactly what it said it would not in Independence – reading into the 
Missouri Constitution “words that are not there.”
181
   
Central to his argument is that Quinn v. Buchanan should not have been 
overruled.
182
  He claimed the majority had misunderstood Quinn’s holding 
and logic.
183
  When Quinn stated that the Missouri Constitution’s bill of  
rights (1) did not create “new rights” and (2) that its provisions were self-
executing, it actually did not treat those inferences as absolutes.
184
  Quinn 
merely stated that normally bill of rights provisions are self-executing        
and that, in the absence of legislative remedies for the violations of such 
rights, individuals may protect their rights “by any appropriate common law 
or code remedy.”
185
  Thus, article 1, section 29’s location in a bill of rights 
casts light on its purpose – to recognize the right to collective bargaining that 
may be protected by the judiciary when violated.
186
  According to the dissent, 
this is perfectly illustrated by the Quinn Court’s enjoining of Buchanan’s 
union-busting activities, which violated article 1, section 29.
187
  He then   
argued that Quinn had not held that bill of rights provisions could never im-
pose affirmative duties, just that article 1, section 29 clearly did not do so.
188
  
He based this conclusion on the plain meaning of the provision and was not 
persuaded by the majority’s citation of foreign jurisdictions which found af-
firmative duties in constitutional provisions that were “entirely unrelated” to 
article 1, section 29.
189
   
The dissent argued that both Quinn and the drafters of the Missouri 
Constitution thought the purpose of article 1, section 29 was to protect the 
right of public bargaining and not to establish procedures to facilitate that 
process.
190
  This is an independently significant purpose that is not, as the 
majority claimed, rendered meaningless without an affirmative duty on the 
  
 181. E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Mo. 
2012) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 182. Id. at 766. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 766-67. 
 185. Id. at 767 (quoting Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W. 2d 413, 417 (Mo. 1957)). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 766. 
 188. Id. at 767. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 768. 
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part of employers.
191
  Fischer noted that prior to legislative or constitutional 
authorization, organization for the purpose of collective bargaining had been 
illegal and, further, that in the earlier part of the twentieth century, union-
busting activities (like that in Quinn) were far more common than they are 
today.
192
  Thus, the right established by article 1, section 29 would not have 
been viewed as meaningless without affirmative duties at the time of its adop-
tion.
193
  It protected (and continues to protect) employees from coercion by 
their employers.
194
  The fact that such coercion may be less commonplace 
today does not hollow out article 1, section 29 or “justify this Court ascribing 
a meaning to the provision it does not have.”
195
 
The dissent would hold that “when a public employer refuses to negoti-
ate with its employees or fails to set up a framework to facilitate bargaining, 
no violation of article I, section 29, occurs.”
196
  He contends that the majori-
ty’s holding expands article 1, section 29 into a “labor relations act” by re-
quiring employers to collectively bargain, adopting procedural frameworks 
“when necessary.”
197
  As noted above, this holding flowed from the Court’s 
language in Independence which recognized the “role of the general assembly 
. . . – in the absence of a statute covering teachers – to set the framework for 
these public employees to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing.”
198
  The dissent maintains that this language was dicta 
and was misread by the majority.
199
  He argued that in Independence, the 
district had a “role” to play in setting a bargaining framework only because 
that district had already chosen to bargain with the teachers.
200
  But in any 
event, this language did not mean that: (1) public employers in all circum-
stances will have a role to play, and (2) having a role in the process does not 
amount to a legally enforceable duty to negotiate or set bargaining frame-
works.
201
  According to the dissent, this is precisely what the majority opinion 
was requiring regardless of its “when necessary” qualifying language or the 
fact that it would not go so far as to allow a court to specify the framework to 
be adopted.
202
  “[T]he mere fact that the legislature has created a framework 
  
 191. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Mo. 2012) 
(Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. See id.  
 195. Id. 
 196. E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 768 (Mo. 
2012) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. at 765. 
 198. Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 
131, 136 (Mo. 2007); see discussion supra Part III.B. 
 199. E. Mo. Coal. Of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 769 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 200. Id. at 768. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 769. 
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for certain employees of the state does not obligate it, under article 1, section 
29, to create a framework for other employees.”
203
 
The dissent also noted that article 1, section 29 does not include the 
words “meet and confer,” “duty to negotiate,” “good faith,” or “any other 
phrase imposing an affirmative duty on employers.”
204
  He also stated that 
when the Independence Court discussed meeting and conferring as a part     
of bargaining, it was attempting to define collective bargaining using Mis-
souri’s public sector labor law – the only place such language could be 
found.
205
 Instead, Independence’s only article 1, section 29 holding was that 
the provision applied to all employees.
206
  It stopped short of holding that the 
provision required employers to bargain (defined as “meet, confer and dis-
cuss”) with their employees.
207
  He also argued that the majority’s citation of 
the duty to bargain in good faith’s history in federal law did not support im-
putation of a good faith standard into article 1, section 29.
208
  Those federal 
laws and agency interpretations were put in place to “facilitate the process” of 
collective bargaining which was not the purpose of article 1, section 29.
209
  
Locating an affirmative duty with a good faith standard in the state constitu-




The dissent also found the majority’s holdings to seriously implicate 
separation of powers issues: 
The courts should perform their judicial function and determine 
whether the right has been violated rather than the legislative function 
of imposing obligations not found in the text of article I, section 29, 
this Court’s prior opinions interpreting article I, section 29, or the con-




Together with Independence in 2007, American Federation of Teachers 
and Fraternal Order of Police highlight an interesting and developing area of 
Missouri labor law.  With its dual 2012 decisions, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held that an employee’s constitutional right to collective bargaining 
  
 203. Id. 
 204. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Mo. 2012) 
(Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 205. Id. at 374. 
 206. Id. at 373. 
 207. Id. at 374. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 370. 
 210. Id. 
 211. E. Mo. Coal of Police v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 771 (Mo. 
2012) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
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necessarily confers an affirmative duty on public employers to collectively 
bargain in good faith with the goal of reaching an agreement.
212
  This means 
that article 1, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution not only protects a pub-
lic employee’s right to bargain through a union, but also requires employers 
actually to recognize, meet, confer, and bargain with those unions.
213
  Em-
ployers must do so in good faith and sincerely attempt to reach agreement, 
but they may reject any and all proposals.
214
  These rights and duties are le-
gally enforceable.
215
   
But is the constitutional holding of an affirmative duty to negotiate in 
good faith truly a significant step forward or just recognition of the status 
quo?  That depends on how one reads the key passage of Independence, dis-
cussed above, regarding the “role” public employers play in collective bar-
gaining.
216
  The language in question came at a point where the Court was 
discussing the relationship between the constitutional right to collective bar-
gaining and the public sector labor law.
217
  The Independence Court found 
that article 1, section 29 applied to all employees, public or private.
218
  At that 
point it could either: (1) find the statutory exclusion of teachers (and police) 
unconstitutional, or (2) find that employers of excluded public employees 
would take part in the collective bargaining process apart from, but in a simi-
lar manner to, the statutory framework.
219
  As noted above, that Court chose 
the second option.
220
  The majority in Fraternal Order of Police and Ameri-
can Federation of Teachers seemed to read that piece of the Independence 
decision as a predicate for requiring all public employers of statutorily ex-
cluded employees to collectively bargain with their employees.
221
  It saw that 




 212. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 S.W.3d at 367. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id.  
 215. Id.  
 216. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 217. Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 
131, 136 (Mo. 2007). 
 218. Id. at 141. 
 219. Id. at 136. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Mo. 2012); E. 
Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 760 (Mo. 2012). 
 222. It should be noted that after the decision was handed down, at least         
some who followed the case thought Independence definitively established that public 
employers must bargain with employee unions.  Paul Hampel, Government Workers 
Win Right to Bargain, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 30, 2007, at A1, available     
at 2007 WLNR 10100159.  In a May 30, 2007 article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,  
a spokeswoman for the Missouri National Education Association was quoted: “It’s a 
pretty exciting day for us . . . .  For 60 years, we fought to win back that right.      
From here on out, this means that districts no longer only have to voluntarily negoti-
ate with us.  This gives teachers an absolute right to sit at the bargaining table.”  Id.  
 
21
Bay: Bay: Bargaining with Bite
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Bay – Final Formatting 3/17/14 Created on:  3/18/2014 6:18:00 PM Last Printed: 3/18/2014 6:18:00 PM 
1320 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
Read that way, the instant decisions seem quite routine.  All the majority has 
done is make concrete the affirmative duty that Independence flirted with but 
failed to make explicitly clear.  Moreover, after its strong inventory of the 
history of good faith bargaining at the federal level, it certainly seems not 
only natural but also prudent to mandate a good faith duty for Missouri em-
ployers.  After all, collective bargaining without someone to genuinely bar-
gain with is counterintuitive. 
However, the dissent read the same passage of Independence more nar-
rowly and stated that it was only dicta.
223
  It found that Independence’s only 
constitutional holding was that article 1, section 29 applied to all Missouri 
employees
224
 and that the Court’s statement that the Independence School 
District was to play a role in the bargaining process was specific to the facts 
of that case, namely that the Independence School District had already agreed 
to collectively bargain.
225
  The context of the Independence language in ques-
tion was the Court’s discussion of the constitutionality of the public sector 
labor laws, not an interpretation of article 1, section 29.
226
  Read this way, the 
Court’s work in the instant decisions is a much more significant step and, as 
the dissent put it, a “surprising new interpretation of article 1, section 29.”
227
   
There is at least some reason to believe the dissent has a strong basis for 
this view.  The Independence Court held that just because the public sector 
labor statutes excluded certain occupations from their bargaining framework, 
they did not preclude those occupations from exercising their article 1, sec-
tion 29 right in some other way, such as a situation where an employer has 
agreed to bargain (as was the case in Independence).
228
  The Court did not 
interpret article 1, section 29 in any other way and did not discuss affirmative 
duties at all.  Independence was silent (or arguably unclear) about whether 
public employers moving forward were affirmatively required to recognize 
and bargain with unions.  Furthermore, at the time of the decision, Quinn v. 
  
On July 1, 2007, Michael Delaney, of the Kansas City law firm Spencer Fane Britt   
& Browne, issued a memo detailing the holdings and impact on labor law of        
Independence.  “Missouri public employers must bargain collectively with the repre-
sentatives of their employees . . . .  So long as a public employer satisfies its         
obligation to entertain proposals from the employees’ representative, the employer 
remains empowered to implement its own terms and conditions over the objection of 
the employees’ representative.”  Michael F. Delaney, Missouri Supreme Court Rec-
ognizes Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Rights, JDSUPRA LAW NEWS, Jul. 
1, 2007, available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/missouri-supreme-court-
recognizes-public-87188/. 
 223. E. Mo. Coal. of Police, 386 S.W.3d at 769 (Fischer, J., dissenting); see dis-
cussion supra Part IV.C. 
 224. Id. at 770. 
 225. Id. at 768. 
 226. Id. at 769. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. at 760. 
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Buchanan was still good law and directly opposed to the proposition that 
public employers, by virtue of article 1, section 29, were required to collec-
tively bargain.  The fact that neither the Court nor the parties in Independence 
cited Quinn lends some support to the contention that the decision did not 
actually address or consider employer obligations as part of article 1, section 
29 at all. 
In sum, the dissent mounts persuasive arguments supporting its view 
that the majority’s holdings are not supported by text or stare decisis.  Neither 
the text nor the debates of the Missouri Constitution, the many years of prec-
edent relying on Quinn, nor the Independence decision support the new inter-
pretation of article 1, section 29.  However, the majority has wisdom on its 
side, and the outcomes it reaches are good ones.  Despite the notion that some 
public employers may genuinely wish to deal directly with their employees 
without union obligations,
229
 imposing a good faith duty to bargain reflects 
the realities of the modern workplace and will likely promote stability.   
The Court’s holdings in Fraternal Order of Police and American Feder-
ation of Teachers will have a significant impact in the broader area of public 
sector labor law.  It has only been five years since Independence.  That deci-
sion left many questions open, some of which have now been addressed in the 
instant decisions.  However, while this burgeoning area of Missouri law is 
now somewhat clearer, questions still remain.   
In his Independence dissent, Judge Price stated that the expansion of   
the article 1, section 29 right would yield an application that “no one can pre-
dict.”
230
  This right has now been clearly defined by the majority in Fraternal 
Order of Police and American Federation of Teachers, but the question of   
its application is no more predictable than it was in 2007.  Judge Brecken-
ridge for the American Federation of Teachers majority was keenly aware   
of this, recognizing the “inherent tension between the duty to bargain with a 
serious attempt to resolve differences and the employer’s freedom to reject 
any proposal.”
231
  The Court seemed to indicate that this “inherent tension” 
resulted from the fact that employers must bargain in good faith with the  
intent to reach an agreement but are not actually required to reach agree-
  
 229. In a 2008 St. Louis Post-Dispatch interview discussing the impact of Inde-
pendence, St. Louis labor attorney Michael Lowenbaum was asked whether unions 
have a place in modern society.   
They do, but employers have really gotten smarter about the benefit for        
the employer to work directly with their employees . . . .  I’m talking about an 
enlightened employer who really works with people and puts that into action . 
. . .  In some ways, yes, companies would like to work without the unions.  
But they’ve found there’s a lot of benefit to it.  
Repps Hudson, This Law Firm Has to Take a Side, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 
25, 2008, at B5, available at 2008 WLNR 1495478. 
 230. Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 
131, 148 (Mo. 2007) (Price, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 231. 387 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Mo. 2012). 
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ment.
232
  However, this tension is certainly nothing new and is precisely the 
situation that private employees have been presented with under federal labor 
law for years.
233
   
Good faith bargaining is inherently difficult because ultimately it is a 
subjective state of mind manifesting itself in a genuine desire to reach agree-
ment.  Judge Breckenridge noted that good faith “is a concrete quality, de-
scriptive of the motivating purpose of one’s act or conduct when challenged 
or called in question.”
234
  In 1914, the Supreme Court of Missouri said that 
parties act in good faith when they act “without simulation or pretense, inno-
cently and in an attitude of trust and confidence . . . honestly, openly, sincere-
ly, without deceit, covin, or any form of fraud.”
235
  Because it cannot be prac-
tically defined, it can only be exemplified by conduct that violates it.  State 





 232. Id.  
 233. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006) states: 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of 
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but 
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession . . . . 
 234. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 387 S.W.3d at 367 (quoting Mun. Bond & Mortg. 
Corp. v. Bishop’s Harbor Drainage Dist., 17 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. 1994)). 
 235. State ex rel. West v. Diemer, 164 S.W. 517, 521 (Mo. 1914) (Lamm, J.,  
concurring). 
 236. An examination of the extensive body of federal and state case law on        
the issues of unfair labor practices and good faith in the collective bargaining context 
is beyond the scope of this Note.  However, the NLRB offers a helpful primer on     
its website: 
In determining whether a party is bargaining in good faith, the Board will look 
at the totality of the circumstances.  The duty to bargain in good faith is an ob-
ligation to participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present 
intention to find a basis for agreement.  This implies both an open mind and a 
sincere desire to reach an agreement as well as a sincere effort to reach a 
common ground.  The additional requirement to bargain in “good faith” was 
incorporated to ensure that a party did not come to the bargaining table and 
simply go through the motions.  There are objective criteria that the NLRB 
will review to determine if the parties are honoring their obligation to bargain 
in good faith, such as whether the party is willing to meet at reasonable times 
and intervals and whether the party is represented by someone who has the au-
thority to make decisions at the table.  Conduct away from the bargaining ta-
ble may also be relevant.  For instance if an Employer were to make a unilat-
eral change in the terms and conditions of employees employment without 
bargaining, that would be an indication of bad faith. 
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Indeed, in American Federation of Teachers, the union argued for       
the well-settled federal standard of good faith in collective bargaining.
237
       
It claimed that because article 1, section 29 mirrors section 7 of the       
NLRA and was enacted after it, the Missouri Constitution drafters intended  
to incorporate relevant federal law.
238
  Further, the trial court had conditional-
ly held that the actions of the board in American Federation of Teachers  
constituted a failure to bargain in good faith under federal law.
239
  Interesting-
ly, the Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case for a determination     
of the definition of good faith under Missouri law.
240
  It said that federal    




The Court may simply have viewed full incorporation of the fed-       
eral good faith bargaining standard as an unnecessarily broad stroke.  Yet      
it could also be evidence that the Court intended the Missouri standard of 
good faith to differ from the federal standard in some meaningful way.      
Regardless, the issue is an open one, and, given the sparseness of Missouri 
case law on good faith in the collective bargaining context, it is not clear how 
the good faith standard in Missouri will evolve and the extent to which it will 
reflect federal law.   
Thus, the questions moving forward are many, not least of which is what 
good faith bargaining means in Missouri.  How will the standard be defined 
and enforced in the public sector?  The Missouri General Assembly can act to 
define it statutorily, or it can be resolved judicially on a case-by-case basis.  
However, if case-by-case, the question then is what body of law Missouri 
courts are to look to for help.  However, judges are not the only ones in need 
of guidance.  How must public employers now conduct themselves at the 
bargaining table to satisfy their good faith duty?  And from a labor stand-
point, will public employee unions see these decisions as a license to sue for a 
good faith violation each time an agreement is not struck? 
The Missouri standard will continue to evolve as litigation on the issue 
is instigated.  It is unlikely that unions will have a cause of action each time 
an agreement is not reached.  Under federal law, failure to reach an agree-
ment is not per se evidence of an unfair labor practice constituting failure to 
bargain in good faith.
242
  In the hypothetical case of a public body going 
through the motions of collective bargaining without intending ever to reach 
agreement, a violation of good faith could not be established unless the union 
could point to specific evidence occurring at (or away) from the bargaining 
  
Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/employerunion-rights-obligations (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
 237. 387 S.W.3d at 367 n.5. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 367-68. 
 240. Id. at 368. 
 241. Id. at 367-68. 
 242. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
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table, such as the employer making extreme demands, refusal to engage in 
honest “give and take,” or refusal to release information substantiating its 
proposals.
243
   It cannot simply claim that failure to reach agreement means 
the employer was not bargaining in good faith, and the instant decisions 
should do nothing to change that.   
On the other hand, unlike the NLRA and private industry, Missouri pub-
lic employees cannot strike.
244
  So perhaps a softer standard of good faith 
should emerge in this area because public unions are unable to threaten strike 
as a bargaining chip.  It remains to be seen just how active a role an employer 
must play in negotiations to satisfy the good faith duty.  In an article follow-
ing the decisions, George Suggs, attorney for AFT, said, “If you’re going to 
say people can collectively bargain, you can’t say they get to go to the table 
and throw out the proposals, and the employer can say ‘Thank you very 
much, we’ll get back to you,’ then walk out of the room and do whatever they 
want.”
245
  Indeed, the article 1, section 29 duty is legally enforceable, and in 
the absence of strike, unions unhappy with employer behavior at the bargain-
ing table have no recourse but to attempt to legally enforce it.  Public unions 
have a new cause of action, and it may be reasonable to expect that Missouri 
courts will now be faced with a number of such good faith lawsuits.  Whether 
courts will allow the good faith standard to parallel federal law remains to be 
seen.  Perhaps they will instead rely more heavily on the case law of other 
states that have similar or more expansive public sector labor provisions. 
Additionally, action by the Missouri General Assembly may now be 
imminent.  As noted above, numerous bills have been proposed since 2007   
to amend Missouri’s public sector labor laws.  The bills have variously 
sought to remove the exclusion of teachers and law enforcement from the 
public sector law, add a good faith standard, and even change the provisions 
into a more full-blown true collective bargaining regime complete with pro-
cedures for recognizing representatives, bargaining units, and resolving    
impasses.
246
  None of those bills have been passed.  As the law now stands, 
the impacts of the instant decisions are probably already being felt.  Law en-
forcement and teachers are guaranteed good faith bargaining with their     
employers, but no statutory framework exists that applies to them.  So in the 
  
 243. In 1956, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the findings of the 
NLRB that an employer’s refusal to release financial records that would substantiate 
its claim that it could not agree to a wage increase constituted an unfair labor practice.  
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956). 
 244. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.530 (1997). 
 245. Scott Lauck, High Court Expands Public-Sector Union Ruling, MO. LAW. 
MEDIA, Nov. 21, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 25253386.  
 246. See, e.g., H.B. 1829, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); S.B. 
761, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); H.B. 1159, 95th Gen. Assemb., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S.B. 473, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); 
H.B. 2030, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S.B. 1115, 94th Gen. As-
semb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008). 
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wake of these holdings, Missouri cities and school districts surely are scram-
bling to put procedures in place that will allow them to meet their constitu-
tional bargaining duties.  These procedures are now necessary, but may be 
arduous for cities and school districts that have historically enjoyed amicable 
voluntary negotiations. 
The state legislature is in an interesting position to resolve this difficul-
ty.  Past efforts to bring teachers and law enforcement into the public sector 
labor laws and establish a statutory good faith standard have failed. With the 
Court’s holding that a good faith duty is located in the state constitution, 
however, it seems that the dissent was correct when it warned in American 
Federation of Teachers that more is now required in collective bargaining 
with teachers and law enforcement than with other public employees who are 
covered by the public sector labor laws.
247
  This is because the “Meet and 
Confer” provision contains no good faith standard.
248
  If the constitutional 
good faith bargaining duty evolves in a manner resembling collective bar-
gaining under federal law, public employers covered by the public sector 
labor laws will likely hope that this provision remains unchanged so that they 
are subject to less onerous requirements.  However, it is quite possible that 
because the Court’s holding was a constitutional one, the “Meet and Confer” 
provision is now vulnerable to constitutional attack as inconsistent with arti-
cle 1, section 29 for lack of a good faith standard. 
The legislature should act quickly to resolve this issue.  It can, as past 
bills have proposed, act to define collective bargaining with a good faith 
standard.  The simplest approach would be to amend the “Meet and Confer” 
provision as follows:  
Whenever such proposals are presented by the exclusive bargaining 
representative to a public body, the public body or its designated rep-
resentative or representatives shall meet, confer and discuss in good 
faith such proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of em-
ployment of the employees of the public body with the labor organiza-
tion which is the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees 
in a unit appropriate.
249
 
This would directly mirror the NLRA’s definition of collective bargain-
ing as “the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and          
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer   
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions    
of employment.”
250
   
However, the problem still remains that teachers and law enforcement 
are excluded from the public sector labor laws, leaving many more questions 
  
 247. 387 S.W.3d 360, 375 (Mo. 2012) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 248. Id. at 374. 
 249. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.520 (1997) (proposed language emphasized). 
 250. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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regarding collective bargaining under article 1, section 29.
251
  Missouri’s 
public sector labor laws are concise and not overly regulatory, but they do 
define appropriate bargaining units, “exclusive bargaining representative,” 
and establish minimal procedures for conducting and concluding bargain-
ing.
252
  But if the statutory exclusion remains in force, how will these collat-
eral issues be determined for teachers and law enforcement under article 1, 
section 29 collective bargaining?  The legislature can resolve inconsistency 
by amending the public sector labor laws to not only add a good faith stand-
ard to the “Meet and Confer” provision but also to remove the statutory ex-
clusion and bring teachers and law enforcement into the fold.  Indeed, to date 
there is a bill currently under consideration in the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives seeking to remove this exclusion.
253
   
It is also possible that, given the limited coverage of the public sector 
labor laws and the Court’s interpretation of article 1, section 29, public labor 
unions could press the legislature for a more expansive approach – complete-
ly repealing the public sector labor laws and enacting a new and more com-
prehensive statutory framework.  This kind of “mini NLRA” regime has been 
proposed in past Missouri bills
254
 and enacted in several other states.
255
  Be-
cause of the highly politicized nature of labor relations both at the federal and 
state levels, a “mini NLRA” for public employees would face a tough path 
  
 251. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.510 (1997). 
 252. §§ 105.500, 105.520.  
 253. See H.B. 357, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013). 
 254. Proposed in 2008, Senate Bill 1115 sought to repeal the public sector labor 
provisions, replacing them with ten new sections collectively titled the “Public    
Employment Relations Act.”  S.B. 1115, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2008).  The bill maintained the no-strike position and contained a right to work provi-
sion.  Id.  It excluded only elected officials, representatives of a public body, certain 
temporary and confidential workers, Missouri judges, and inmates/patients of state 
institutions.  Id.  It included detailed provisions for the determination of bargaining 
units, election and certification of bargaining representatives, conducting and       
concluding negotiations, and a list of unfair labor practices.  Id.  The bill defined 
collective bargaining as:  
negotiate[ing] in good faith at reasonable times and places with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . with the in-
tention of reaching an agreement . . . .  The obligation to bargain collectively 
shall not mean that either party is compelled to agree to a proposal nor shall it 
require the making of a concession.  
Id. 
 255. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 23.40.070-23.40.260 (2013); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-1318 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 447.201-447.609 (2013); 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 89-1 – 89-23 (2013); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 §§ 315/1-
315/23 (2013); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.1-20.31 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
423.201-423.217 (2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179A.01-179A.40 (2013); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1369 – 81-1390 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 288.010-
288.280 (2013); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 34:13a-1 – 34:13a-43 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 10-7e-1 – 10-7e-26 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.27 (2013). 
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through any state legislature, and Missouri may be wary of such a drastic 
change in law.  Legislative inaction over the last several years on this issue 
may or may not be indicative of intent of the General Assembly not to heavily 
regulate public sector unions and bargaining.  Regardless, action by the Mis-
souri legislature soon would provide guidance to the courts, employers, un-
ions, and employees that will soon face these issues. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whether American Federation of Teachers and Eastern Coalition of Po-
lice are surprising new interpretations of the Missouri Constitution or just 
natural next steps, article 1, section 29 collective bargaining has taken a more 
definite shape.  The right established by Independence has now been given 
teeth in the form of a cause of action for public unions.  Critics may call the 
decisions too pro-union; supporters may say they are pro-employee, fair, and 
just.  In any event, public sector collective bargaining is changing, and not 
just for teachers and law enforcement.  Article 1, section 29 impacts all em-
ployees, and they will all surely be watching its evolution over time.  It is not 
clear yet what good faith will come to mean under Missouri law.  Equally 
unclear is what other obligations will be imposed on employers now forced to 
establish procedures necessary to make collective bargaining happen.  There 
is no statute to guide them, and if the General Assembly would like to avoid 
an ad-hoc fix, it should act quickly to amend the public sector labor statutes 
and provide direction. 
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